Reply to My Critics: (Re-)Defining Racism: A Philosophical Analysis
In (Re-)Defining Racism, I offer the first comprehensive examination of the philosophical literature on racism and argue for a new methodological approach that I call conventionalism. Framing my argument within this approach, I defend an oppression theory of racism. In this article, I will attempt t...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
2021
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| In: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Year: 2021, Volume: 24, Issue: 3, Pages: 679-698 |
| Further subjects: | B
Grammatical analysis
B Racial oppression B semantic externalism B Moralism B Moral Responsibility B Metalinguistic negotiation B Wittgenstein B Descriptive Analysis B Conventionalism B Semantic internalism B Political morality B Prescriptive analysis B Racism |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Summary: | In (Re-)Defining Racism, I offer the first comprehensive examination of the philosophical literature on racism and argue for a new methodological approach that I call conventionalism. Framing my argument within this approach, I defend an oppression theory of racism. In this article, I will attempt to accomplish two goals: offer a reply to the thoughtful comments of my critics, and lay out the main argument and major themes of my book in an accessible manner. First, I will describe the philosophical problem of defining “racism” and explain why I think a new methodological approach is necessary to address this problem. Second, I will present the moralist presupposition of my project and extend my oppression theory of racism in response to the challenge of assigning responsibility for oppression. Finally, I will address several criticisms to my prescriptive approach, including: (1) my prescriptive approach unjustifiably privileges moralist explanation (explaining why racism is bad) over social explanation (explaining the causes of racism); (2) the tool of semantic clarification, which my conventionalist framework draws upon, is inadequate for resolving conceptual disagreement; (3) my call for scholars to negotiate the meaning of “racism” is unlikely to succeed and would be insufficient to inspire social change if it were to succeed; and, finally, (4) my conventionalist approach is wedded to a misguided intensionalist semantics, for an extensionalist semantics is more appropriate for the term “racist.” |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-021-10207-2 |