La scelta razionale (rational choice): un confronto tra Tommaso d'Aquino e tre Nobel per l'Economia
Today there are many studies about economic thinking of Aquinas, but little on the use of the reason in the context of rational choice. This contribution highlights sur- prising analogies between the thomistic electio pattern, related to the doctrine of ratio prudentialis, and the theories of some N...
| Published in: | Gregorianum |
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| Main Author: | |
| Format: | Electronic/Print Article |
| Language: | Italian |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Pontificia Univ. Gregoriana
2021
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| In: |
Gregorianum
Year: 2021, Volume: 102, Issue: 2, Pages: 371-395 |
| IxTheo Classification: | KAE Church history 900-1300; high Middle Ages NBE Anthropology TK Recent history VA Philosophy |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (doi) |
| Summary: | Today there are many studies about economic thinking of Aquinas, but little on the use of the reason in the context of rational choice. This contribution highlights sur- prising analogies between the thomistic electio pattern, related to the doctrine of ratio prudentialis, and the theories of some Nobel Prize winners for Economics, which are strongly critical of the rational choice of the mainstream economics: Amartya Sen (1998), Vernon L. Smith (2002) and Herbert Simon (1978). Firstly, the Aristote- lian-Thomist choice allows to give reason for the plurality of motivations and their “hierarchization”, which underlie the economic decision, as proposed by the Indian Nobel in his Theory of “Meta ordering of preferences”. Secondly, it allows to wel- come the results of the Evolutive Economy, expressed in the “ecological rationality” of V.L. Smith, according to which human rationality is not only of the cartesian type, but also the result of cultural and biological evolutive processes. This welcome ap- pears possible due to the fact that the aristotelic-thomistic theory conceives the minor premise of the syllogism as a cognitive-affective “perception”. Finally, it is possible to find convergence between H. Simon’s “limited rationality” and the Tommasian ratio prudentialis: the first, it developed in the context of Cognitive and Behavioral Economics, it highlights that human rationality is “structurally limited”; the second, is conceived as intellectus obumbratus, unable to understand fully the particular actions to be performed, and influenced by affects and pure spirits. Therefore, Aquinas and the three Nobel Prize criticize the rational choice of the economic mainstream, start- ing from a different use of reason: from compositional to resolutive, from abstract to psychologically rooted and from dis-inculturated to inculturated. This means that the economic choice is open to a plurality of reasons, it is always very personal and social, and it is operated by a symbolic and not only rational homo oeconomicus. |
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| ISSN: | 0017-4114 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Gregorianum
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.32060/gregorianum.102/1.2021.371-395 |