Should we Dispense with the Idea of Personhood?: The Impoverishment of Philosophical-Theological Language
"Who is a person?" is a question with moral, theological and even legal consequences, but it seems now apparently entangled in intractable puzzles; therefore, it has become frequent to suggest that we should entirely dispense with the idea of "personhood". This essay argues that...
| Subtitles: | ¿Hay que prescindir de la idea de personalidad?$dEl empobrecimiento del lenguaje filosófico-teológico |
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| Authors: | ; |
| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
[publisher not identified]
2021
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| In: |
Scripta theologica
Year: 2021, Volume: 53, Issue: 2, Pages: 273-304 |
| IxTheo Classification: | KAJ Church history 1914-; recent history NBE Anthropology VA Philosophy |
| Further subjects: | B
No identificada
B Persona B Dereck Parfit B Bernard Williams B Robert Nozick B Derek Parfit B Non-Identity B Edmund Husserl B Personhood |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Summary: | "Who is a person?" is a question with moral, theological and even legal consequences, but it seems now apparently entangled in intractable puzzles; therefore, it has become frequent to suggest that we should entirely dispense with the idea of "personhood". This essay argues that the notions of "person", and rational "nature" which are essential in theological exploration, cannot be easily discarded from the philosophical vocabulary either. The paper argues that the preferred route of access should preserve the noetic heterogeneity of beings, because it is the current "scientistic" straitjacket that has made very articulation of the question fruitless and impoverished. "¿Qué o quién es una persona?" es una pregunta con consecuencias morales, teológicas y legales evidentes, pero que está rodeada de confusión. Se ha sugerido con frecuencia que se debería prescindir por completo de la idea de "personalidad". Este ensayo sostiene que las nociones de «persona» e incluso de "naturaleza" racional, esenciales en teología, no pueden descartarse del vocabulario filosófico. El artículo argumenta que el acceso a la idea de "personalidad" debe preservar la heterogeneidad noética de los seres, porque la camisa de fuerza "cientificista" que la ignora ha hecho que la misma pregunta sea infructuosa y más pobre. |
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| ISSN: | 2254-6227 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Scripta theologica
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.15581/006.53.2.273-304 |