How Not to Know the Principle of Induction
Abstract In The Problems of Philosophy, Bertrand Russell presents a justification of induction based on a principle he refers to as “the principle of induction.” Owing to the ambiguity of the notion of probability, the principle of induction may be interpreted in two different ways. If interpreted i...
| Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
|---|---|
| Τύπος μέσου: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο |
| Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
| Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Έκδοση: |
2021
|
| Στο/Στη: |
International journal for the study of skepticism
Έτος: 2021, Τόμος: 11, Τεύχος: 3, Σελίδες: 243-254 |
| Τυποποιημένες (ακολουθίες) λέξεων-κλειδιών: | B
Russell, Bertrand 1872-1970, The problems of philosophy
/ Επαγωγή
/ Πιθανισμός <ηθική θεολογία> (Φιλοσοφία (μοτίβο))
|
| Σημειογραφίες IxTheo: | AB Φιλοσοφία της θρησκείας, Κριτική της θρησκείας, Αθεϊσμός VA Φιλοσοφία |
| Άλλες λέξεις-κλειδιά: | B
circularity
B justification of induction B David Hume B principle of induction B Bertrand Russell |
| Διαθέσιμο Online: |
Πιθανολογούμενα δωρεάν πρόσβαση Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Σύνοψη: | Abstract In The Problems of Philosophy, Bertrand Russell presents a justification of induction based on a principle he refers to as “the principle of induction.” Owing to the ambiguity of the notion of probability, the principle of induction may be interpreted in two different ways. If interpreted in terms of the subjective interpretation of probability, the principle of induction may be known a priori to be true. But it is unclear how this should give us any confidence in our use of induction, since induction is applied to the external world outside our minds. If the principle is interpreted in light of the objective interpretation of induction, it cannot be known to be true a priori, since it applies to frequencies that occur in the world outside the mind, and these cannot be known without recourse to experience. Russell’s principle of induction therefore fails to provide a satisfactory justification of induction. |
|---|---|
| ISSN: | 2210-5700 |
| Περιλαμβάνει: | Enthalten in: International journal for the study of skepticism
|
| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/22105700-bja10020 HDL: 11343/281415 |
