Is Piety a Natural Virtue?
Notwithstanding Aristotle’s own relative silence on the matter, in this paper I argue that piety is a natural (not supernatural) virtue of the Aristotelian kind. I begin with St. Thomas’s discussion of the virtues of religion and piety in which he shows how they both involve a recognition of human c...
Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
---|---|
Τύπος μέσου: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο |
Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
Έκδοση: |
2019
|
Στο/Στη: |
Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association
Έτος: 2019, Τόμος: 93, Σελίδες: 253-262 |
Σημειογραφίες IxTheo: | ΚΑΕ Εκκλησιαστική Ιστορία 900-1300, Ώριμος Μεσαίωνας NCA Ηθική VA Φιλοσοφία |
Διαθέσιμο Online: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Σύνοψη: | Notwithstanding Aristotle’s own relative silence on the matter, in this paper I argue that piety is a natural (not supernatural) virtue of the Aristotelian kind. I begin with St. Thomas’s discussion of the virtues of religion and piety in which he shows how they both involve a recognition of human contingency and our radically dependent nature. Building off of this Thomistic analysis, I offer both an account of Aristotelian virtue in general and a phenomenological analysis of piety in particular, in which I situate piety with respect to the other Aristotelian virtues. Finally, I close with a discussion of a few natural objections, including questions about the limits of natural reason as well as considering why Aristotle himself did not explicitly treat piety as a moral virtue. |
---|---|
ISSN: | 2153-7925 |
Περιλαμβάνει: | Enthalten in: American Catholic Philosophical Association, Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association
|
Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.5840/acpaproc2021426118 |