Is Piety a Natural Virtue?

Notwithstanding Aristotle’s own relative silence on the matter, in this paper I argue that piety is a natural (not supernatural) virtue of the Aristotelian kind. I begin with St. Thomas’s discussion of the virtues of religion and piety in which he shows how they both involve a recognition of human c...

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Λεπτομέρειες βιβλιογραφικής εγγραφής
Κύριος συγγραφέας: Lu, M. T. (Συγγραφέας)
Τύπος μέσου: Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο
Γλώσσα:Αγγλικά
Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: HBZ Gateway
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Interlibrary Loan:Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany)
Έκδοση: 2019
Στο/Στη: Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association
Έτος: 2019, Τόμος: 93, Σελίδες: 253-262
Σημειογραφίες IxTheo:ΚΑΕ Εκκλησιαστική Ιστορία 900-1300, Ώριμος Μεσαίωνας
NCA Ηθική 
VA Φιλοσοφία
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Περιγραφή
Σύνοψη:Notwithstanding Aristotle’s own relative silence on the matter, in this paper I argue that piety is a natural (not supernatural) virtue of the Aristotelian kind. I begin with St. Thomas’s discussion of the virtues of religion and piety in which he shows how they both involve a recognition of human contingency and our radically dependent nature. Building off of this Thomistic analysis, I offer both an account of Aristotelian virtue in general and a phenomenological analysis of piety in particular, in which I situate piety with respect to the other Aristotelian virtues. Finally, I close with a discussion of a few natural objections, including questions about the limits of natural reason as well as considering why Aristotle himself did not explicitly treat piety as a moral virtue.
ISSN:2153-7925
Περιλαμβάνει:Enthalten in: American Catholic Philosophical Association, Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.5840/acpaproc2021426118