Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas on What is “Better-Known” in Natural Science

Aristotelian commenters have long noted an apparent contradiction between what Aristotle’s says in Posterior Analytics I.2 and Physics I.1 about how we obtain first principles of a science. At Posterior 71b35-72a6, Aristotle states that what is most universal (καθόλου) is better-known by nature and...

Full description

Saved in:  
Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Boyer, John H. (Author)
Contributors: Wagner, Daniel C.
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
Check availability: HBZ Gateway
Journals Online & Print:
Invalid server response. (JOP server down?)
Interlibrary Loan:Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany)
Published: 2019
In: Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association
Year: 2019, Volume: 93, Pages: 199-225
IxTheo Classification:KAE Church history 900-1300; high Middle Ages
VA Philosophy
Online Access: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
Description
Summary:Aristotelian commenters have long noted an apparent contradiction between what Aristotle’s says in Posterior Analytics I.2 and Physics I.1 about how we obtain first principles of a science. At Posterior 71b35-72a6, Aristotle states that what is most universal (καθόλου) is better-known by nature and initially less-known to us, while the particular (καθ’ ἕκαστον) is initially better-known to us, but less-known by nature. At Physics 184a21-30, however, Aristotle states that we move from what is better-known to us, which is universal (καθόλου), to what is better-known absolutely, which is particular (καθ’ ἕκαστον). This paper turns to two of Aristotle’s most notable medieval commentators—Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas—to resolve this apparent contradiction. The key to Thomas and Albert’s solutions, we will argue, is a twofold distinction between a sense-perceptive and scientific universal, and the particulars as sensed individuals and as differentiating attributes. Our Synthetic treatment of these distinctions contributes to the ongoing scholarly effort to understand the Stagyrite’s complex theory of knowledge.
ISSN:2153-7925
Contains:Enthalten in: American Catholic Philosophical Association, Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.5840/acpaproc2021512129