The Problem of Genesis in Derrida and Daoism

Among the many theories that explain the becoming of all things in the universe, there is a metaphysical viewpoint that all things are originated from one pure origin which is preceded by nothing. This metaphysical viewpoint can be called the idea of genesis. Derrida proposes that this concept of ‘g...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Kwok, Sai Hang (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Springer Netherlands 2021
In: Sophia
Year: 2021, Volume: 60, Issue: 2, Pages: 441-456
Further subjects:B Daoism
B Derrida
B Genesis
B Time
Online Access: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
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Summary:Among the many theories that explain the becoming of all things in the universe, there is a metaphysical viewpoint that all things are originated from one pure origin which is preceded by nothing. This metaphysical viewpoint can be called the idea of genesis. Derrida proposes that this concept of ‘genesis’ itself is founded upon a contradiction; ‘genesis, …, brings together two contradicting meanings in its concept: one of origin, one of becoming.’ (Jacque Derrida, The Problem of Genesis in Husserl’s Philosophy, trans. Marian Hobson (Chicago and London: Chicago University Press, 2003), p. xxi.) Based on this paradox, Derrida proposes that all philosophical attempts to recover the pure origin here-and-now, which are categorized as the metaphysics of presence, are impossible. In this paper, I argue that Derrida’s criticism is based on the Augustinian question of time which presupposes that only the present moment is real. Recovery of the origin therefore means to reduce the non-present to the present. I contend that Daoism can respond to Derrida’s criticism because it possesses a nested idea of time—the idea that each present is encompassed by a deeper level of present as the background context. Accordingly, the recovery of origin does not mean to return to an elapsed past but a deeper context of all occurrence. This explains why dao, when it is understood as the origin of things in the world, does not succumb to Derrida’s criticism. Furthermore, it provides an alternative solution to the Derridean paradox of genesis.
ISSN:1873-930X
Contains:Enthalten in: Sophia
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s11841-020-00762-z