The problem of arbitrary requirements: an abrahamic perspective
Some religious requirements seem genuinely arbitrary in the sense that there seem to be no sufficient explanation of why those requirements with those contents should pertain. This paper aims to understand exactly what it might mean for a religious requirement to be genuinely arbitrary and to discer...
Authors: | ; ; |
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Tipo de documento: | Recurso Electrónico Artigo |
Idioma: | Inglês |
Verificar disponibilidade: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Publicado em: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
2021
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Em: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Ano: 2021, Volume: 89, Número: 3, Páginas: 221-242 |
(Cadeias de) Palavra- chave padrão: | B
Judaísmo
/ Cristianismo
/ Islã
/ Mandamento
/ Arbitrariedade
/ Obediência
/ Racionalidade
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Classificações IxTheo: | AB Filosofia da religião BH Judaísmo BJ Islã CB Existência cristã FA Teologia |
Outras palavras-chave: | B
Rationality of religious requirements
B Arbitrary requirements B religious obligations |
Acesso em linha: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Resumo: | Some religious requirements seem genuinely arbitrary in the sense that there seem to be no sufficient explanation of why those requirements with those contents should pertain. This paper aims to understand exactly what it might mean for a religious requirement to be genuinely arbitrary and to discern whether and how a religious practitioner could ever be rational in obeying such a requirement (even with full knowledge of its arbitrariness). We lay out four accounts of what such arbitrariness could consist in, and show how each account provides a different sort of baseline for understanding how obedience to arbitrary requirements could, in principle, be rational. |
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ISSN: | 1572-8684 |
Obras secundárias: | Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11153-020-09775-7 |