A defense of modal appearances
I argue that beliefs about what appears possible are justified in much the same way as beliefs about what appears actual. I do so by chisholming, and then modalizing, the epistemic principle associated with phenomenal conservatism. The principle is tested against a number of examples, and it gives t...
Main Author: | |
---|---|
Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
2021
|
In: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2021, Volume: 89, Issue: 3, Pages: 243-261 |
Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Modality
/ Epistemologische Überzeugung
/ Ontological proof of God's existence
/ Dualism
/ Cartesian dualism
|
IxTheo Classification: | AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism VA Philosophy |
Further subjects: | B
Conceivability
B Phenomenal Conservatism B Ontological Argument B Modal epistemology B Dualism |
Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |