Are the psychophysical laws fine-tuned?
Neil Sinhababu (Am Philos Q 54(1):89–98, 2017) has recently argued against the fine-tuning argument for God. They claim that the question of the universe’s fine-tuning ought not be ‘why is the universe so hospitable to life?’ but rather ‘why is the universe so hospitable to morally valuable minds?’...
Main Author: | |
---|---|
Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Springer Nature B. V
2021
|
In: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2021, Volume: 89, Issue: 3, Pages: 285-292 |
Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Psychophysischer Parallelismus
/ Proof of God's existence
|
IxTheo Classification: | AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism NBC Doctrine of God NCA Ethics |
Further subjects: | B
Psychophysical laws
B Embodiment B Fine-tuning |
Online Access: |
Volltext (kostenfrei) |
Summary: | Neil Sinhababu (Am Philos Q 54(1):89–98, 2017) has recently argued against the fine-tuning argument for God. They claim that the question of the universe’s fine-tuning ought not be ‘why is the universe so hospitable to life?’ but rather ‘why is the universe so hospitable to morally valuable minds?’ and that, moreover, the universe isn’t so hospitable. For it is metaphysically possible that psychophysical laws be substantially more permissive than they in fact are, allowing for the realisation of morally valuable consciousness by exceptionally simple physical states and systems, rather than the complex states of brains. I reply that Sinhababu’s argument rests upon unsupported claims and that we have reason to doubt that an omnibenevolent God would make the psychophysical laws more permissive than they in fact are. |
---|---|
ISSN: | 1572-8684 |
Contains: | Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
|
Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11153-020-09783-7 |