Reconsidering a human right to democracy
In this brief article, I will raise some challenges to each of Pablo Gilabert’s arguments for a HRD. First, I will question whether the instrumental case for affirming a HRD is as strong as Gilabert and others have suggested. I will then call into question the argument from moral risk, arguing that,...
| Published in: | Journal of global ethics |
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| Main Author: | |
| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group
2020
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| In: |
Journal of global ethics
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| Further subjects: | B
Human Rights
B Democracy B Legitimacy B right to democracy |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Summary: | In this brief article, I will raise some challenges to each of Pablo Gilabert’s arguments for a HRD. First, I will question whether the instrumental case for affirming a HRD is as strong as Gilabert and others have suggested. I will then call into question the argument from moral risk, arguing that, for any particular country, we should not operate with a strong presumption that they should pursue further democratization as a high-priority goal. Finally, I will consider the strength of our intuitive support for a stringent human right to democracy. As Gilabert points out, there could be a genuine HRD, even if it did not always provide us with an overriding reason to call for the implementation of democracy. I will explore how much normative priority claims to respect democratic decisions have by considering what we have reason to do when democratic decisions would lead to violations of other, noncontroversial human rights. |
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| ISSN: | 1744-9634 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Journal of global ethics
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1080/17449626.2020.1869057 |