Are There Heavyweight Perceptual Reasons?

Genia Schönbaumsfeld has recently argued for the view that our ordinary perceptual reasons provide support for heavyweight metaphysical and epistemological views, such as that there is a mind-independent physical world. Call this the Heavyweight Reasons Thesis. In this paper, I argue that we should...

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
1. VerfasserIn: Ranalli, Chris (Verfasst von)
Medienart: Elektronisch Aufsatz
Sprache:Englisch
Verfügbarkeit prüfen: HBZ Gateway
Fernleihe:Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste
Veröffentlicht: 2021
In: International journal for the study of skepticism
Jahr: 2021, Band: 11, Heft: 2, Seiten: 93-118
normierte Schlagwort(-folgen):B Schönbaumsfeld, Genia 1973-, The illusion of doubt / Erkenntnistheorie
IxTheo Notationen:AB Religionsphilosophie; Religionskritik; Atheismus
VA Philosophie
weitere Schlagwörter:B factive reasons
B heavyweight implications
B New Evil Demon
B epistemic perception
B perceptual reasons
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Zusammenfassung:Genia Schönbaumsfeld has recently argued for the view that our ordinary perceptual reasons provide support for heavyweight metaphysical and epistemological views, such as that there is a mind-independent physical world. Call this the Heavyweight Reasons Thesis. In this paper, I argue that we should reject the Heavyweight Reasons Thesis. I also argue that the rejection of the Heavyweight Reasons Thesis is compatible with the Factive Perceptual Reasons Thesis, the thesis that our perceptual reasons for our ordinary beliefs can be factive, but that factive reasons aren’t necessarily better reasons than subjectively indiscriminable non-factive reasons.
ISSN:2210-5700
Enthält:Enthalten in: International journal for the study of skepticism
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1163/22105700-bja10003