Sex, Love, and Paternalism

Paternalistic behaviour directed towards a person’s informed and competent decisions is often thought to be morally impermissible. This view is supported by what we can call the Anti-Paternalism Principle (APP). While APP might seem plausible when employed to show the wrongness of paternalism by the...

Full description

Saved in:  
Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Birks, David (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
Check availability: HBZ Gateway
Journals Online & Print:
Drawer...
Fernleihe:Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste
Published: Springer Science + Business Media B. V [2021]
In: Ethical theory and moral practice
Year: 2021, Volume: 24, Issue: 1, Pages: 257-270
Further subjects:B Paternalism
B Consent
B Love
B Sex
B Associative duties
Online Access: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)

MARC

LEADER 00000naa a22000002 4500
001 1753274567
003 DE-627
005 20210407143308.0
007 cr uuu---uuuuu
008 210407s2021 xx |||||o 00| ||eng c
024 7 |a 10.1007/s10677-021-10162-y  |2 doi 
035 |a (DE-627)1753274567 
035 |a (DE-599)KXP1753274567 
040 |a DE-627  |b ger  |c DE-627  |e rda 
041 |a eng 
084 |a 1  |2 ssgn 
100 1 |a Birks, David  |e VerfasserIn  |4 aut 
245 1 0 |a Sex, Love, and Paternalism 
264 1 |c [2021] 
336 |a Text  |b txt  |2 rdacontent 
337 |a Computermedien  |b c  |2 rdamedia 
338 |a Online-Ressource  |b cr  |2 rdacarrier 
520 |a Paternalistic behaviour directed towards a person’s informed and competent decisions is often thought to be morally impermissible. This view is supported by what we can call the Anti-Paternalism Principle (APP). While APP might seem plausible when employed to show the wrongness of paternalism by the state, there are some cases of paternalistic behaviour between private, informed, and competent individuals where APP seems mistaken. This raises a difficulty for supporters of APP. Either they need to reject APP to accommodate our intuitions in these cases, or provide grounds for thinking that paternalistic behaviour between certain private individuals is different in a morally relevant sense. In this paper, I explore several possible morally relevant differences, and find all of them unsatisfactory as grounds for maintaining the plausibility of APP. 
650 4 |a Associative duties 
650 4 |a Consent 
650 4 |a Love 
650 4 |a Paternalism 
650 4 |a Sex 
773 0 8 |i Enthalten in  |t Ethical theory and moral practice  |d Dordrecht [u.a.] : Springer Science + Business Media B.V, 1998  |g 24(2021), 1, Seite 257-270  |h Online-Ressource  |w (DE-627)320527093  |w (DE-600)2015306-5  |w (DE-576)104558555  |x 1572-8447  |7 nnns 
773 1 8 |g volume:24  |g year:2021  |g number:1  |g pages:257-270 
856 4 0 |u https://doi.org/10.1007/s10677-021-10162-y  |x Resolving-System  |z lizenzpflichtig  |3 Volltext 
936 u w |d 24  |j 2021  |e 1  |h 257-270 
951 |a AR 
ELC |a 1 
ITA |a 1  |t 1 
LOK |0 000 xxxxxcx a22 zn 4500 
LOK |0 001 3903113255 
LOK |0 003 DE-627 
LOK |0 004 1753274567 
LOK |0 005 20210407143308 
LOK |0 008 210407||||||||||||||||ger||||||| 
LOK |0 040   |a DE-Tue135  |c DE-627  |d DE-Tue135 
LOK |0 092   |o n 
LOK |0 852   |a DE-Tue135 
LOK |0 852 1  |9 00 
LOK |0 935   |a ixzs  |a ixzo 
ORI |a SA-MARC-ixtheoa001.raw