The Problem of Evil Remains Logically Binding
Most contemporary discussions of the problem of evil assume that “logical” formulations of the problem are untenable, and that we should operate with “evidential” formulations instead. I argue that this consensus is founded on a mistake and that there is no legitimate reason to abandon logically bin...
| Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
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| Τύπος μέσου: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο |
| Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
| Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Φόρτωση...
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| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Έκδοση: |
[2021]
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| Στο/Στη: |
Religions
Έτος: 2021, Τόμος: 12, Τεύχος: 3 |
| Άλλες λέξεις-κλειδιά: | B
Mackie
B evidential B Sterba B problem of evil B Plantinga B logical |
| Διαθέσιμο Online: |
Volltext (kostenfrei) Volltext (kostenfrei) |
| Σύνοψη: | Most contemporary discussions of the problem of evil assume that “logical” formulations of the problem are untenable, and that we should operate with “evidential” formulations instead. I argue that this consensus is founded on a mistake and that there is no legitimate reason to abandon logically binding formulations of the problem of evil. I conclude by arguing that, though it is possible to formulate a genuinely “evidential” problem of evil, logical formulations of the problem of evil are preferable in all cases. |
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| ISSN: | 2077-1444 |
| Αναφορά: | Kommentar in "Sixteen Contributors (2021)"
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| Περιλαμβάνει: | Enthalten in: Religions
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.3390/rel12030154 |
