Violence, Shame, and Moral Agency - An Exploration of Krista K. Thomason's Position
Krista Thomason’s account of shame explains the link between shame and violence as something that arises out of a tension between our identity and our self-conception: those things about which we feel shame are part of our identities, but they are not part of our self-conception. She sees violence a...
Main Author: | |
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Linköping Univ. Electronic Press
[2020]
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In: |
De Ethica
Year: 2020, Volume: 6, Issue: 1, Pages: 23-34 |
Further subjects: | B
Object of the act
B Account of evil B Intention / End B Virtue Ethics B Intrinsic evil |
Online Access: |
Volltext (kostenfrei) Volltext (kostenfrei) |
Summary: | Krista Thomason’s account of shame explains the link between shame and violence as something that arises out of a tension between our identity and our self-conception: those things about which we feel shame are part of our identities, but they are not part of our self-conception. She sees violence as an attempt to regain agency and control and overcome shame. Although this is an important trait in shame, to explain violence as a response to the loss of agency is not sufficient. Furthermore, it cannot explain serious self-harm as the result of shame, since such reactions undermined the agency she holds that violence attempts to reclaim. Hence, these features need to be incorporated into a wider account of shame that sees it as a response to the interruption of intentional projects and attempts for coherent agency. |
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ISSN: | 2001-8819 |
Contains: | Enthalten in: De Ethica
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.3384/de-ethica.2001-8819.206123 |