Is It Rational to Reject Expert Consensus?
Abstract Philosophers defend, and often believe, controversial philosophical claims. Since they aren’t clueless, they are usually aware that their views are controversial—on some occasions, the views are definitely in the minority amongst the relevant specialist-experts. In addition, most philosophe...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Published: |
2020
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| In: |
International journal for the study of skepticism
Year: 2020, Volume: 10, Issue: 3/4, Pages: 325-345 |
| Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Philosopher
/ Philosophical faith
/ Expert
/ Rejection of
/ Irrationality
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| IxTheo Classification: | AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism VA Philosophy |
| Further subjects: | B
epistemology of philosophy
B Disagreement B Skepticism B Controversy B Metaphilosophy B Expertise |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (Resolving-System) Volltext (Verlag) |
| Summary: | Abstract Philosophers defend, and often believe, controversial philosophical claims. Since they aren’t clueless, they are usually aware that their views are controversial—on some occasions, the views are definitely in the minority amongst the relevant specialist-experts. In addition, most philosophers are aware that they are not God’s gift to philosophy, since they admit their ability to track truth in philosophy is not extraordinary compared to that of other philosophers. In this paper I argue that in many real-life cases, such beliefs in controversial claims are irrational. This means that most philosophers have irrational philosophical beliefs. |
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| ISSN: | 2210-5700 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: International journal for the study of skepticism
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/22105700-BJA10015 |