Political corruption and firm value in the U.S.: do rents and monitoring matter?

Political corruption imposes substantial costs on shareholders in the U.S. Yet, we understand little about the basic factors that exacerbate or mitigate the value consequences of political corruption. Using federal corruption convictions data, we find that firm-level economic rents and monitoring me...

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Auteurs: Brown, Nerissa C. ca. 20./21. Jh. (Auteur) ; Smith, Jared (Auteur) ; White, Roger M. (Auteur) ; Zutter, Chad J. (Auteur)
Type de support: Électronique Article
Langue:Anglais
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Interlibrary Loan:Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany)
Publié: 2021
Dans: Journal of business ethics
Année: 2021, Volume: 168, Numéro: 2, Pages: 335-351
Sujets non-standardisés:B Firm value
B Political corruption
B Aufsatz in Zeitschrift
B Tobin's Q
Accès en ligne: Volltext (lizenzpflichtig)
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Résumé:Political corruption imposes substantial costs on shareholders in the U.S. Yet, we understand little about the basic factors that exacerbate or mitigate the value consequences of political corruption. Using federal corruption convictions data, we find that firm-level economic rents and monitoring mechanisms moderate the negative relation between corruption and firm value. The value consequences of political corruption are exacerbated for firms operating in low-rent product markets and mitigated for firms subject to external monitoring by state governments or monitoring induced by disclosure transparency. Our results should inform managers and policymakers of the tradeoffs imposed on firms operating in politically corrupt districts.
ISSN:1573-0697
Contient:Enthalten in: Journal of business ethics
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s10551-019-04181-0