An empirically testable causal mechanism for divine action
A form of special divine action often considered central to the everyday experience of Christianity is that of a personal interaction with God. For example, in The Second Person Perspective in Aquinas’s Ethics, Andrew Pinsent characterises this interaction in terms of mutually empathic relations tha...
Autor principal: | |
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Tipo de documento: | Recurso Electrónico Artigo |
Idioma: | Inglês |
Verificar disponibilidade: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
Publicado em: |
[2020]
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Em: |
Stellenbosch theological journal
Ano: 2020, Volume: 6, Número: 4, Páginas: 247-282 |
Classificações IxTheo: | NBC Deus ZA Ciências sociais |
Acesso em linha: |
Volltext (doi) Volltext (kostenfrei) |
Resumo: | A form of special divine action often considered central to the everyday experience of Christianity is that of a personal interaction with God. For example, in The Second Person Perspective in Aquinas’s Ethics, Andrew Pinsent characterises this interaction in terms of mutually empathic relations that serve to “infuse” virtues and other attributes into a person. Such interaction requires that causal relations exist between a necessary being and the contingent universe. This paper addresses a central problem of special divine action: that the empirically identifiable causes of physical events are modally ill-suited for (and epistemically distinct from) the action of an eternal, non-composite, necessary being. Accounts of what brings about physical events are standardly empirical accounts, grounded upon experience of the world. |
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ISSN: | 2413-9467 |
Obras secundárias: | Enthalten in: Stellenbosch theological journal
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.17570/stj.2020.v6n4.a10. |