Heavenly freedom, derivative freedom, and the value of free choices
Sennett (1999) and Pawl and Timpe (2009; 2013) attempt to show how we can praise heavenly agents for things they inevitably do in heaven by appealing to the notion of derivative freedom. Matheson (2017) has criticized this use of derivative freedom. In this article I show why Matheson's argumen...
Main Author: | |
---|---|
Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Cambridge Univ. Press
[2020]
|
In: |
Religious studies
Year: 2020, Volume: 56, Issue: 4, Pages: 455-472 |
Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Heaven
/ Freedom
/ Free will
/ Wahlmöglichkeit
|
IxTheo Classification: | AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism NBC Doctrine of God |
Online Access: |
Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
Summary: | Sennett (1999) and Pawl and Timpe (2009; 2013) attempt to show how we can praise heavenly agents for things they inevitably do in heaven by appealing to the notion of derivative freedom. Matheson (2017) has criticized this use of derivative freedom. In this article I show why Matheson's argument is inconclusive but also how the basic point may be strengthened to undermine the use Sennett and Pawl and Timpe make of derivative freedom. I then show why Matheson is mistaken to claim that the value of free choice depends on an agent retaining the ability to change their mind; in so doing I demonstrate that some choices which result in fixed outcomes - a feature of the choices leading to impeccability - can indeed be valuable even if they cannot be undone. |
---|---|
ISSN: | 1469-901X |
Contains: | Enthalten in: Religious studies
|
Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1017/S0034412518000689 |