What really is the nature of suffering? Three problems with Eric Cassell’s concept of distress

Eric Cassell famously defined suffering as a person’s severe distress at a threat to their personal integrity. This article draws attention to some problems with the concept of distress in this theory. In particular, I argue that Cassell’s theory turns on distress but does not define it, which, in l...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Duffee, Charlotte (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Wiley-Blackwell [2020]
In: Bioethics
Year: 2020, Volume: 34, Issue: 7, Pages: 695-702
IxTheo Classification:NBE Anthropology
NCH Medical ethics
Further subjects:B End-of-life
B Pain
B Distress
B Suffering
B Person
Online Access: Volltext (Verlag)
Volltext (doi)
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Summary:Eric Cassell famously defined suffering as a person’s severe distress at a threat to their personal integrity. This article draws attention to some problems with the concept of distress in this theory. In particular, I argue that Cassell’s theory turns on distress but does not define it, which, in light of the complexity of distress, problematizes suffering in three ways: first, suffering becomes too equivocal to apply in at least some cases that Cassell nevertheless identifies as suffering; second, Cassell’s account does not explain what sort of experience suffering is, resulting in theoretical and practical difficulties in distinguishing it from other medical conditions; third, there is good reason to believe that, in medical contexts, ‘distress’ just means ‘suffering’ or some cognate concept not yet distinguished from it, rendering Cassell’s theory circular. I consider a rebuttal to my objections and reply, concluding that Cassell’s theory of suffering needs a definition of distress to settle what the nature of suffering really is.
ISSN:1467-8519
Contains:Enthalten in: Bioethics
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1111/bioe.12748