The ethical dimension of equity incentives: a behavioral agency examination of executive compensation and pension funding

We draw on the behavioral agency model to explore the ethical consequences of CEO equity incentives. We argue that CEOs are more concerned with funding pension plans when they have more to gain from their stock options yet will increasingly underfund employee pension funds as their current option we...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Martin, Geoffrey (Author)
Contributors: Wiseman, Robert M. ; Gomez-Mejia, Luis R. 1949-
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Interlibrary Loan:Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany)
Published: 2020
In: Journal of business ethics
Year: 2020, Volume: 166, Issue: 3, Pages: 595-610
Further subjects:B Behavioral agency
B Incentives
B Stakeholder agency
B Pension funding
B Executive Compensation
B Aufsatz in Zeitschrift
B Ethical decision making
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Summary:We draw on the behavioral agency model to explore the ethical consequences of CEO equity incentives. We argue that CEOs are more concerned with funding pension plans when they have more to gain from their stock options yet will increasingly underfund employee pension funds as their current option wealth increases. Our findings reveal that both effects hold when the CEO has greater power (also occupying board chair) over firm decision making. Our study suggests that there is an ethical dimension to equity incentives, given they are intended to align CEO interests with shareholders, yet potentially incentivize CEO behaviors with adverse consequences for employees. Insights from our findings provide boards and regulators with behavioral levers to protect employee well-being in the context of pension funding.
ISSN:1573-0697
Contains:Enthalten in: Journal of business ethics
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s10551-019-04134-7