Irreducibly Thick Evaluation is not Thinly Evaluative
In this paper, I criticize the pairing of irreducible thickness (the view that thick concepts do not reduce to thin evaluations plus some descriptive component) with the traditional view of evaluation which says evaluation is a matter of encoding good or bad in some way. To do this, I first explicat...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
[2020]
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| In: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Year: 2020, Volume: 23, Issue: 3/4, Pages: 651-666 |
| Further subjects: | B
Determinate and Determinable
B Ethics B Evaluation B Determination Relation B Thomas, Alan B Irreducible Thickness B Thick Concepts B Irreducability of the Thick B Antireductionism B Metaethics B Harcourt, Edward |
| Online Access: |
Presumably Free Access Volltext (Resolving-System) |
| Summary: | In this paper, I criticize the pairing of irreducible thickness (the view that thick concepts do not reduce to thin evaluations plus some descriptive component) with the traditional view of evaluation which says evaluation is a matter of encoding good or bad in some way. To do this, I first explicate the determination view, which holds that irreducibly thick concepts are to thin concepts as determinates are to determinables. I then show that, even if the determination view did establish irreducible thickness, it would not have proven that the evaluative is well understood as being an instance of the determination relation; in order to do that, the determination view needs to show how the evaluative fit a general analysis of the determination relation. However, when the determination view attempts to fill in the analysis, we get implausible results—so implausible, I claim, that we should see the results as a reductio to the view. To generalize the criticism to any view like the determination view, I show that the same results ensue when we model the evaluative on mereology. Finally, I diagnose the general failure by claiming that the evaluative domain, as conceived by the defender of irreducible thickness, just does not have the structure to secure the tight connection between thick and thin concepts while also carving up our conceptual economy in a plausible way. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-020-10108-w |