Is praying for the morally impermissible morally permissible?
Saul Smilansky has argued that, since acts of petitionary prayer are best understood as requests, not desires, there may be many more impermissible prayer acts than one might expect. I discuss Smilansky’s analysis and argue that his conclusion follows only for those who do not believe in an omnipote...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic/Print Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Taylor & Francis
[2014]
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| In: |
International journal of philosophy and theology
Year: 2014, Volume: 75, Issue: 3, Pages: 254-264 |
| Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Prayer of petition
/ Hope
/ Omnipotence
/ Evil
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| IxTheo Classification: | CB Christian life; spirituality NBC Doctrine of God |
| Further subjects: | B
Saul Smilansky
B Philosophy of religion B problem of evil B problem of petitionary prayer B Prayer |
| Online Access: |
Resolving-System |
| Summary: | Saul Smilansky has argued that, since acts of petitionary prayer are best understood as requests, not desires, there may be many more impermissible prayer acts than one might expect. I discuss Smilansky’s analysis and argue that his conclusion follows only for those who do not believe in an omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly benevolent deity and take advantage of what Smilansky calls the theist’s ‘moral escape clause’. However, I take my argument to lead us to a variant of the problems of evil and petitionary prayer instead of a problem with Smilansky’s reasoning, requirng us to either abandon at least one of three properties commonly assigned to God or else to abandon an intuitive account of prayer that makes it morally impermissible to pray for morally impermissible ends. |
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| ISSN: | 2169-2327 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: International journal of philosophy and theology
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1080/21692327.2014.967795 |