Intention and Moral Enhancement
Recently philosophers have proposed a wide variety of interventions referred to as ‘moral enhancements’. Some of these interventions are concerned with helping individuals make more informed decisions; others, however, are designed to compel people to act as the intervener sees fit. Somewhere betwee...
Main Author: | |
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Wiley-Blackwell
[2016]
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In: |
Bioethics
Year: 2016, Volume: 30, Issue: 9, Pages: 714-720 |
IxTheo Classification: | NBE Anthropology NCH Medical ethics |
Further subjects: | B
hat-hiding
B moral enhancement B neuroenhancement B Intention B moral compulsion B hat-hanging B moral bioenhancement |
Online Access: |
Presumably Free Access Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
Summary: | Recently philosophers have proposed a wide variety of interventions referred to as ‘moral enhancements’. Some of these interventions are concerned with helping individuals make more informed decisions; others, however, are designed to compel people to act as the intervener sees fit. Somewhere between these two extremes lie interventions designed to direct an agent's attention either towards morally relevant issues - hat-hanging - or away from temptations to do wrong - hat-hiding. I argue that these interventions fail to constitute genuine moral enhancement because, although they may result in more desirable outcomes - more altruism, more law-following, and/or less self-destructive behavior, they ignore a person's intentions, and often what makes an action right or wrong is the intent behind it. |
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ISSN: | 1467-8519 |
Contains: | Enthalten in: Bioethics
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1111/bioe.12284 |