The Identity Objection to the future-like-ours argument
Some critics of Don Marquis's ‘future-like-ours’ anti-abortion argument launch what has been called the Identity Objection. The upshot of this objection is that under a psychological theory of personal identity, a non-sentient fetus lacks precisely what Marquis believes gives it a right to life...
Main Author: | |
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Contributors: | |
Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Wiley-Blackwell
[2019]
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In: |
Bioethics
Year: 2019, Volume: 33, Issue: 2, Pages: 287-293 |
IxTheo Classification: | NBE Anthropology NCH Medical ethics |
Further subjects: | B
future-like-ours
B Vogelstein B Marquis B Abortion B Personal Identity |
Online Access: |
Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
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520 | |a Some critics of Don Marquis's ‘future-like-ours’ anti-abortion argument launch what has been called the Identity Objection. The upshot of this objection is that under a psychological theory of personal identity, a non-sentient fetus lacks precisely what Marquis believes gives it a right to life - a future like ours. However, Eric Vogelstein, in a recent article, has argued that under this theory of personal identity a non-sentient fetus, in fact, has a future like ours, which he believes dissolves the Identity Objection. But Vogelstein is mistaken. Even if he is correct that there is a sense in which a non-sentient fetus has a future of value under a psychological theory of personal identity, the sense in which it has one is importantly different from the sense in which we have one, meaning that, under such a theory, a non-sentient fetus does not have a future like ours. | ||
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