The Identity Objection to the future-like-ours argument

Some critics of Don Marquis's ‘future-like-ours’ anti-abortion argument launch what has been called the Identity Objection. The upshot of this objection is that under a psychological theory of personal identity, a non-sentient fetus lacks precisely what Marquis believes gives it a right to life...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Brill, Skott (Author)
Contributors: Stratton-Lake, Philip (Bibliographic antecedent)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Wiley-Blackwell [2019]
In: Bioethics
Year: 2019, Volume: 33, Issue: 2, Pages: 287-293
IxTheo Classification:NBE Anthropology
NCH Medical ethics
Further subjects:B future-like-ours
B Vogelstein
B Marquis
B Abortion
B Personal Identity
Online Access: Volltext (Verlag)
Volltext (doi)

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520 |a Some critics of Don Marquis's ‘future-like-ours’ anti-abortion argument launch what has been called the Identity Objection. The upshot of this objection is that under a psychological theory of personal identity, a non-sentient fetus lacks precisely what Marquis believes gives it a right to life - a future like ours. However, Eric Vogelstein, in a recent article, has argued that under this theory of personal identity a non-sentient fetus, in fact, has a future like ours, which he believes dissolves the Identity Objection. But Vogelstein is mistaken. Even if he is correct that there is a sense in which a non-sentient fetus has a future of value under a psychological theory of personal identity, the sense in which it has one is importantly different from the sense in which we have one, meaning that, under such a theory, a non-sentient fetus does not have a future like ours. 
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