The impairment argument for the immorality of abortion: A reply
In his recent article Perry Hendricks presents what he calls the impairment argument to show that abortion is immoral. To do so, he argues that to give a fetus fetal alcohol syndrome is immoral. Because killing the fetus impairs it more than giving it fetal alcohol syndrome, Hendricks concludes that...
| Autore principale: | |
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| Altri autori: | ; |
| Tipo di documento: | Elettronico Articolo |
| Lingua: | Inglese |
| Verificare la disponibilità: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Pubblicazione: |
[2019]
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| In: |
Bioethics
Anno: 2019, Volume: 33, Fascicolo: 6, Pagine: 723-724 |
| Notazioni IxTheo: | NBE Antropologia NCH Etica della medicina |
| Altre parole chiave: | B
impairment argument
B fetal alcohol syndrome B Abortion B Personhood |
| Accesso online: |
Volltext (Publisher) Volltext (doi) |
| Riepilogo: | In his recent article Perry Hendricks presents what he calls the impairment argument to show that abortion is immoral. To do so, he argues that to give a fetus fetal alcohol syndrome is immoral. Because killing the fetus impairs it more than giving it fetal alcohol syndrome, Hendricks concludes that killing the fetus must also be immoral. Here, I claim that killing a fetus does not impair it in the way that giving it fetal alcohol syndrome does. By examining the reason why giving a fetus this condition is wrong, I conclude that the same reasoning, on common pro-choice accounts, does not apply to killing the fetus. Accordingly, Hendricks's argument does not succeed in showing abortion is immoral. |
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| ISSN: | 1467-8519 |
| Riferimento: | Kritik von "Even if the fetus is not a person, abortion is immoral (2019)"
Kritik in "(Regrettably) Abortion remains immoral (2019)" |
| Comprende: | Enthalten in: Bioethics
|
| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1111/bioe.12576 |
