Metaphysics to the rescue?: Four-dimensionalism and the twinning argument against conceptionism
The view that human beings begin to exist at fertilization (namely conceptionism) faces a serious challenge from the twinning argument, that identical twins coming from the same zygote must be numerically distinct from the zygote and so did not exist at fertilization. Recently, some philosophers hav...
| Main Author: | |
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| Contributors: | ; |
| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Wiley-Blackwell
[2020]
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| In: |
Bioethics
Year: 2020, Volume: 34, Issue: 5, Pages: 542-548 |
| IxTheo Classification: | NBE Anthropology NCH Medical ethics |
| Further subjects: | B
conceptionism
B Zygote B exdurantism B endurantism B Metaphysics B Twinning B perdurantism |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
| Summary: | The view that human beings begin to exist at fertilization (namely conceptionism) faces a serious challenge from the twinning argument, that identical twins coming from the same zygote must be numerically distinct from the zygote and so did not exist at fertilization. Recently, some philosophers have claimed that the twinning argument rests on a particular metaphysical theory of persistence, namely endurantism, on which a human being, for example, is wholly present at every moment of her existence. And we can easily refute the argument, they claim, by employing perdurantism or exdurantism, according to which a human being is a temporally extended entity with temporal parts or a momentarily existing stage who has other momentarily existing stages as counterparts. I argue that such claims are mistaken. The twinning argument does not rest on endurantism and can be formulated in terms of perdurantism to provide a good reason for perdurantists to reject conceptionism. And exdurantism does not have any advantage in defending conceptionism either, for it already concedes more than what the twinning argument aims to show. |
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| ISSN: | 1467-8519 |
| Reference: | Kritik von "A ZYGOTE COULD BE A HUMAN: A DEFENCE OF CONCEPTIONISM AGAINST FISSION ARGUMENTS (2012)"
Kritik von "Stages of life (2019)" |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Bioethics
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1111/bioe.12712 |