Won’t Get Fooled Again: Wittgensteinian Philosophy and the Rhetoric of Empiricism
The debate surrounding eliminative materialism, and the role of empiricism more broadly, has been one of the more prominent philosophical debates of the last half-century. But too often what is at stake in this debate has been left implicit. This essay surveys the rhetoric of two participants in thi...
Main Author: | |
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
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Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Springer Netherlands
[2020]
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In: |
Sophia
Year: 2020, Volume: 59, Issue: 2, Pages: 345-363 |
Further subjects: | B
Rhetorical criticism
B Empiricism B Philosophy of mind B Metaphor B Materialism B Wittgenstein |
Online Access: |
Volltext (Resolving-System) |
Summary: | The debate surrounding eliminative materialism, and the role of empiricism more broadly, has been one of the more prominent philosophical debates of the last half-century. But too often what is at stake in this debate has been left implicit. This essay surveys the rhetoric of two participants in this debate, Paul Churchland and Thomas Nagel, on the question of whether or not scientific explanations will do away with the need for nonscientific descriptions. Both philosophers talk about this possibility in language reminiscent of revolutionary politics. These authors do not see eliminative materialism merely as an idea to be evaluated, but a revolution to be welcomed or quashed. After surveying their rhetoric, the paper turns to the work of four philosophers—G.E.M. Anscombe, Peter Winch, Paul Holmer, and G.H. von Wright—to suggest that there is within Wittgensteinian tradition a ‘nonrevolutionary’ approach to the question of eliminative materialism. |
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ISSN: | 1873-930X |
Contains: | Enthalten in: Sophia
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11841-019-0728-3 |