Artifacts and the Limitations of Moral Considerability

Environmental philosophy always presents detailed distinctions concerning the kinds of natural beings that can be granted moral considerability, when discussing this issue. In contrast, artifacts, which are excluded from the scope of moral considerability, are treated as one homogenous category. Thi...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Hoły-Łuczaj, Magdalena 1987- (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Interlibrary Loan:Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany)
Published: [2019]
In: Environmental ethics
Year: 2019, Volume: 41, Issue: 1, Pages: 69-87
Online Access: Volltext (Verlag)
Volltext (doi)
Description
Summary:Environmental philosophy always presents detailed distinctions concerning the kinds of natural beings that can be granted moral considerability, when discussing this issue. In contrast, artifacts, which are excluded from the scope of moral considerability, are treated as one homogenous category. This seems problematic. An attempt to introduce certain distinctions in this regard—by looking into dissimilarities between physical and digital artifacts—can change our thinking about artifacts in ethical terms, or more precisely, in environmentally ethical terms.
ISSN:2153-7895
Contains:Enthalten in: Environmental ethics
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.5840/enviroethics20194116