Organic Unities and the Problem of Evil: A Reply to Lemos
Chapter 9 constitutes a critical examination of Noah Lemos's contribution to this volume (see Chapter 8). It addresses Lemos's defense of G. E. Moore's principle of organic unities against three objections. The first objection concerns what is involved in contributing to the intrinsic...
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| Format: | Print Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
University Press
[2019]
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| In: |
Oxford studies in philosophy of religion
Year: 2019, Volume: 9, Pages: 183-194 |
| Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Evil
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| IxTheo Classification: | AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism NCA Ethics |
| Summary: | Chapter 9 constitutes a critical examination of Noah Lemos's contribution to this volume (see Chapter 8). It addresses Lemos's defense of G. E. Moore's principle of organic unities against three objections. The first objection concerns what is involved in contributing to the intrinsic value of a state of affairs; the second concerns a kind of evaluative schizophrenia; and the third concerns the concept of evaluative inadequacy. Lemos's response to the third objection is examined at length, and it is argued that this response may not succeed in defeating the objection, in which case the problem of evil may not be as easy to solve as some theodicists have suggested |
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| Reference: | Kritik von "Organic Unities, Summation, and the Problem of Evil (2019)"
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| Contains: | Enthalten in: Oxford studies in philosophy of religion
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