Privation in the Problem of Evil: Impairment, Health, Well-Being, and a Case of Humans and Betazoids
Privative evils are evils that deprive someone of a due good. Chapter 1 considers a special but widespread type of a privative evil, namely impairment. It argues that even though an impairment may deprive someone of a significant and due good, impairments as such do not make for a significant case a...
| Authors: | ; |
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| Format: | Print Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
University Press
[2019]
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| In: |
Oxford studies in philosophy of religion
Year: 2019, Volume: 9, Pages: 1-17 |
| Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Evil
/ Privation
/ Wellness
/ Disturbance
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| IxTheo Classification: | AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism NBC Doctrine of God |
| Summary: | Privative evils are evils that deprive someone of a due good. Chapter 1 considers a special but widespread type of a privative evil, namely impairment. It argues that even though an impairment may deprive someone of a significant and due good, impairments as such do not make for a significant case against theism. The argument is based on thought experiments suggesting that it does not make one significantly worse off when one is lacking a due good as opposed to when one is merely lacking a good, even when the good is itself significant. It is suggested that the point generalizes beyond impairment to at least some other forms of privative evils. And if St. Augustine is right that all evils are privative, then this could form a significant component of a general theodicy. |
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| Contains: | Enthalten in: Oxford studies in philosophy of religion
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