Moral Constraints on Gender Concepts
Are words like woman' or man' sex terms that we use to talk about biological features of individuals? Are they gender terms that we use to talk about non-biological features e.g. social roles? Contextualists answer both questions affirmatively, arguing that these terms concern biological...
| Publicado no: | Ethical theory and moral practice |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Tipo de documento: | Recurso Electrónico Artigo |
| Idioma: | Inglês |
| Verificar disponibilidade: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Carregar...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publicado em: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
[2020]
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| Em: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
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| Outras palavras-chave: | B
Philosophy of gender
B Moral Philosophy B Polysemy B philosophy of language B Contextualism |
| Acesso em linha: |
Presumably Free Access Volltext (Verlag) |
| Resumo: | Are words like woman' or man' sex terms that we use to talk about biological features of individuals? Are they gender terms that we use to talk about non-biological features e.g. social roles? Contextualists answer both questions affirmatively, arguing that these terms concern biological or non-biological features depending on context. I argue that a recent version of contextualism, floated by Jennifer Saul and defended by Esa Diaz-Leon, doesn't exhibit the right kind of flexibility to capture our theoretical intuitions or moral and political practices concerning our uses of these words. I then propose the view that terms like woman' or man' are polysemous, arguing that it makes better sense of the significance of some forms of criticisms of mainstream gender ideology. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
| Obras secundárias: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-020-10060-9 |