Moral Constraints on Gender Concepts

Are words like ‘woman' or ‘man' sex terms that we use to talk about biological features of individuals? Are they gender terms that we use to talk about non-biological features e.g. social roles? Contextualists answer both questions affirmatively, arguing that these terms concern biological...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Ethical theory and moral practice
Main Author: Laskowski, N. G. (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Springer Science + Business Media B. V [2020]
In: Ethical theory and moral practice
Further subjects:B Philosophy of gender
B Moral Philosophy
B Polysemy
B philosophy of language
B Contextualism
Online Access: Presumably Free Access
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Summary:Are words like ‘woman' or ‘man' sex terms that we use to talk about biological features of individuals? Are they gender terms that we use to talk about non-biological features e.g. social roles? Contextualists answer both questions affirmatively, arguing that these terms concern biological or non-biological features depending on context. I argue that a recent version of contextualism, floated by Jennifer Saul and defended by Esa Diaz-Leon, doesn't exhibit the right kind of flexibility to capture our theoretical intuitions or moral and political practices concerning our uses of these words. I then propose the view that terms like ‘woman' or ‘man' are polysemous, arguing that it makes better sense of the significance of some forms of criticisms of mainstream gender ideology.
ISSN:1572-8447
Contains:Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s10677-020-10060-9