Feeling Badly Is Not Good Enough: a Reply to Fritz and Miller
Kyle Fritz and Daniel Miller's (2019) reply to my (2018) article helpfully clarifies their position and our main points of disagreement. Their view is that those who blame hypocritically lack the right to blame for a violation of some moral norm N in virtue of having an unfair disposition to bl...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
[2020]
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| In: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Year: 2020, Volume: 23, Issue: 1, Pages: 101-105 |
| Further subjects: | B
Hypocritical blame
B Weakness of will B Hypocrisy B Standing to blame B Differential blaming disposition B Nonhypocrisy condition |
| Online Access: |
Presumably Free Access Volltext (Verlag) |
| Summary: | Kyle Fritz and Daniel Miller's (2019) reply to my (2018) article helpfully clarifies their position and our main points of disagreement. Their view is that those who blame hypocritically lack the right to blame for a violation of some moral norm N in virtue of having an unfair disposition to blame others, but not themselves, for violations of N. This view raises two key questions. First, are there instances of hypocritical blame that do not involve an unfair differential blaming disposition? Second, if the answer to the first question is Yes, do hypocritical blamers of this kind lack the right to blame? In this paper, I argue that the answer to the first question is Yes. Given this, Fritz and Miller's account faces serious problems regardless of whether the answer to the second question is Yes or No. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
| Reference: | Kritik von "When Hypocrisy Undermines the Standing to Blame (2019)"
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| Contains: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-020-10063-6 |