Is Agent-Causal Libertarianism Unintelligible?: The Problem of Uniqueness and Ontological Commitments
Critics often charge that agent-causal libertarianism is unintelligible due to the uniqueness of agent-causation—the sui generis causal relationship said to be involved when agents make free choices. This paper presents five objections, which are taken to be the only good objections, to agent-causal...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Brill
[2020]
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| In: |
Philosophia reformata
Year: 2020, Volume: 85, Issue: 1, Pages: 1-19 |
| IxTheo Classification: | NBC Doctrine of God NBE Anthropology NCA Ethics VA Philosophy |
| Further subjects: | B
Free Will
B Theism B Timothy O'Connor B Randolph Clarke B rollback argument B Naturalism B agent-causation B event-causation |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
| Summary: | Critics often charge that agent-causal libertarianism is unintelligible due to the uniqueness of agent-causation—the sui generis causal relationship said to be involved when agents make free choices. This paper presents five objections, which are taken to be the only good objections, to agent-causal libertarianism and argues they all fail to show agent-causal libertarianism is unintelligible. The first four objections fail outright. The fifth objection fails in a special way. Naturalistic agent-causal libertarian theories succumb to this fifth objection; theistic agent-causal libertarian theories do not. This entails that if agent-causal libertarianism is intelligible, then it is only so within theism. |
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| ISSN: | 2352-8230 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Philosophia reformata
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/23528230-08501001 |