Is Agent-Causal Libertarianism Unintelligible?: The Problem of Uniqueness and Ontological Commitments

Critics often charge that agent-causal libertarianism is unintelligible due to the uniqueness of agent-causation—the sui generis causal relationship said to be involved when agents make free choices. This paper presents five objections, which are taken to be the only good objections, to agent-causal...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Philosophia reformata
Main Author: Mizell, Stephen D. (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Brill [2020]
In: Philosophia reformata
IxTheo Classification:NBC Doctrine of God
NBE Anthropology
NCA Ethics
VA Philosophy
Further subjects:B Free Will
B Theism
B Timothy O'Connor
B Randolph Clarke
B rollback argument
B Naturalism
B agent-causation
B event-causation
Online Access: Volltext (Verlag)
Volltext (doi)
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Summary:Critics often charge that agent-causal libertarianism is unintelligible due to the uniqueness of agent-causation—the sui generis causal relationship said to be involved when agents make free choices. This paper presents five objections, which are taken to be the only good objections, to agent-causal libertarianism and argues they all fail to show agent-causal libertarianism is unintelligible. The first four objections fail outright. The fifth objection fails in a special way. Naturalistic agent-causal libertarian theories succumb to this fifth objection; theistic agent-causal libertarian theories do not. This entails that if agent-causal libertarianism is intelligible, then it is only so within theism.
ISSN:2352-8230
Contains:Enthalten in: Philosophia reformata
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1163/23528230-08501001