Transcendence in Postmetaphysical Thinking: Habermas's God
Habermas emphasizes the importance for critical thinking of ideas of truth and moral validity that are at once context-transcending and immanent to human practices. in a recent review, Peter Dews queries his distinction between metaphysically construed transcendence and transcendence from within, as...
| Autore principale: | |
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| Tipo di documento: | Elettronico Articolo |
| Lingua: | Inglese |
| Verificare la disponibilità: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Pubblicazione: |
[2019]
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| In: |
European journal for philosophy of religion
Anno: 2019, Volume: 11, Fascicolo: 4, Pagine: 21-44 |
| (sequenze di) soggetti normati: | B
Habermas, Jürgen 1929-
/ Trascendenza
/ Critica alla metafisica
/ Dio
/ Habermas, Jürgen 1929-, Nachmetaphysisches Denken
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| Notazioni IxTheo: | AB Filosofia delle religioni VA Filosofia |
| Altre parole chiave: | B
Institutionalized Authority
B Transcendence B Habermas B Postmetaphysical Thinking B Ethical truth |
| Accesso online: |
Accesso probabilmente gratuito Volltext (KW) Volltext (doi) |
| Riepilogo: | Habermas emphasizes the importance for critical thinking of ideas of truth and moral validity that are at once context-transcending and immanent to human practices. in a recent review, Peter Dews queries his distinction between metaphysically construed transcendence and transcendence from within, asking provocatively in what sense Habermas does not believe in God. I answer that his conception of "God" is resolutely postmetaphysical, a god that is constructed by way of human linguistic practices. I then give three reasons for why it should not be embraced by contemporary critical social theory. First, in the domain of practical reason, this conception of transcendence excludes by fiat any "Other" to communicative reason, blocking possibilities for mutual learning. Second, due to the same exclusion, it risks reproducing an undesirable social order. Third, it is inadequate for the purposes of a critical theory of social institutions. |
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| Comprende: | Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v11i4.2685 |
