Hinge Propositions, Skeptical Dogmatism, and External World Disjunctivism
Following Wittgenstein's lead, Crispin Wright and others have argued that hinge propositions are immune from skeptical doubt. In particular, the entitlement strategy, as we shall refer to it, says that hinge propositions have a special type of justification (entitlement justification) because o...
| Publicado no: | International journal for the study of skepticism |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Tipo de documento: | Recurso Electrónico Artigo |
| Idioma: | Inglês |
| Verificar disponibilidade: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Carregar...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publicado em: |
Brill
[2019]
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| Em: |
International journal for the study of skepticism
Ano: 2019, Volume: 9, Número: 2, Páginas: 134-167 |
| (Cadeias de) Palavra- chave padrão: | B
Wright, Crispin 1942-
/ Proposição
/ Ceticismo
/ Percepção
/ Ilusão
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| Classificações IxTheo: | AB Filosofia da religião VA Filosofia |
| Outras palavras-chave: | B
hinge proposition
B External World B skeptical dogmatism B Skepticism B Underdetermination B Crispin Wright |
| Acesso em linha: |
Volltext (Resolving-System) Volltext (doi) |
| Resumo: | Following Wittgenstein's lead, Crispin Wright and others have argued that hinge propositions are immune from skeptical doubt. In particular, the entitlement strategy, as we shall refer to it, says that hinge propositions have a special type of justification (entitlement justification) because of their role in our cognitive lives. Two major criticisms are raised here against the entitlement strategy when used in attempts to justify belief in the external world. First, the hinge strategy is not sufficient to thwart underdetermination skepticism, since underdetermination considerations lead to a much stronger form of skepticism than is commonly realized. Second, the claim that hinge propositions are necessary to trust perception is false. There is an alternative to endorsing a particular hinge proposition about the external world, external world disjunctivism, which permits us to trust perception (to a point), while skirting the difficulties raised by skepticism. |
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| ISSN: | 2210-5700 |
| Obras secundárias: | Enthalten in: International journal for the study of skepticism
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/22105700-20191318 |