Belief, credence, and faith
In this article, I argue that faith's going beyond the evidence need not compromise faith's epistemic rationality. First, I explain how some of the recent literature on belief and credence points to a distinction between what I call B-evidence and C-evidence. Then, I apply this distinction...
Main Author: | |
---|---|
Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Cambridge Univ. Press
[2019]
|
In: |
Religious studies
Year: 2019, Volume: 55, Issue: 2, Pages: 153-168 |
Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Faith
/ Episteme
/ Credibility
/ Rationality
|
IxTheo Classification: | AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism CB Christian life; spirituality |
Online Access: |
Volltext (Resolving-System) Volltext (doi) |
Summary: | In this article, I argue that faith's going beyond the evidence need not compromise faith's epistemic rationality. First, I explain how some of the recent literature on belief and credence points to a distinction between what I call B-evidence and C-evidence. Then, I apply this distinction to rational faith. I argue that if faith is more sensitive to B-evidence than to C-evidence, faith can go beyond the evidence and still be epistemically rational. |
---|---|
ISSN: | 1469-901X |
Contains: | Enthalten in: Religious studies
|
Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1017/S0034412518000446 |