The modal-epistemic argument for the existence of God is flawed
In a recent article, Emanuel Rutten has presented a novel argument for the existence of God, defined as a personal being that is the first cause of reality. An interesting feature of the argument, which caused quite a stir, is that it does not fall within any of the traditional categories of argumen...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Published: |
[2018]
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| In: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2018, Volume: 84, Issue: 3, Pages: 307-322 |
| Further subjects: | B
Modal-epistemic argument
B Personal first cause B Rutten B God |
| Online Access: |
Presumably Free Access Volltext (Resolving-System) |
| Summary: | In a recent article, Emanuel Rutten has presented a novel argument for the existence of God, defined as a personal being that is the first cause of reality. An interesting feature of the argument, which caused quite a stir, is that it does not fall within any of the traditional categories of arguments for God's existence. Rutten calls his argument a modal-epistemic one, which reflects the fact that the first premise of his argument states that all possible truths are knowable. The main purpose of this article is a simple one: to point out that Rutten's modal-epistemic argument is flawed. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8684 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11153-018-9664-3 |