Rethinking the Imposter Phenomenon
The Imposter Phenomenon-i.e., the phenomenon of feeling like a fraud and like your successes aren't really yours-is typically construed not just as a crisis of confidence, but as a failure of rationality. On the standard story, "imposters" have bad beliefs about their talents because...
| Published in: | Ethical theory and moral practice |
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| Main Author: | |
| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
[2019]
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| In: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
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| IxTheo Classification: | VA Philosophy ZD Psychology |
| Further subjects: | B
Imposter syndrome
B Imposter phenomenon B Self-worth B Culture of genius B intellectual humility |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (Resolving-System) |
| Summary: | The Imposter Phenomenon-i.e., the phenomenon of feeling like a fraud and like your successes aren't really yours-is typically construed not just as a crisis of confidence, but as a failure of rationality. On the standard story, "imposters" have bad beliefs about their talents because they dismiss the evidence provided by their successes. Here I suggest that this standard picture could be mistaken, and that these "imposters" may actually be more rational (on average) than non-imposters. Why? Accounting for the non-talent causes of your successes may require you to lower your confidence in your talents, in which case, "imposter" beliefs are rational. I then go on to suggest a second reason to worry about the standard picture: It does not adequately address the possible role that one's environment has in the production of the phenomenon. To give an example, I hypothesize that environments that host a "culture of genius" can alter our evidential landscape in a way that promotes the Imposter Phenomenon. Finally, I argue that my alternative picture of the Imposter Phenomenon should prompt us to opt for a conception of self-worth that is more deeply tied to virtues like intellectual humility than to relative talent possession. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-019-09984-8 |