Sentimentalism about Moral Understanding

Some have attempted to explain why it appears that action based on deferential moral belief lacks moral worth by appealing to claims about an attitude that is difficult to acquire through testimony, which theorists have called "moral understanding". I argue that this state is at least part...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Howard, Nathan Robert (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
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Published: Springer Science + Business Media B. V [2018]
In: Ethical theory and moral practice
Year: 2018, Volume: 21, Issue: 5, Pages: 1065-1078
IxTheo Classification:NCA Ethics
VA Philosophy
VB Hermeneutics; Philosophy
Further subjects:B Moral testimony
B Normative reasons
B Sentimentalism
B Primary reasons
B Moral understanding
B Donald Davidson
B moral epistemology
Online Access: Volltext (Resolving-System)

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520 |a Some have attempted to explain why it appears that action based on deferential moral belief lacks moral worth by appealing to claims about an attitude that is difficult to acquire through testimony, which theorists have called "moral understanding". I argue that this state is at least partly non-cognitive. I begin by employing case-driven judgments to undermine the assumption that I argue is responsible for the strangeness of deferential moral belief: the assumption that if an agent knows that some fact gives them a moral reason to act in some way, then they're in a position to act that way for the moral reason given by that fact. I then argue that cases from non-moral epistemology concerning properly-based belief give us independent reason to reject this assumption and conclude by sketching a Davidson-inspired account of normative reasons that explains why acting for moral reasons requires the right non-cognitive state, which is worth calling a kind of moral understanding. 
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