When Is Inequality Fair?
Recent literature on responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism has suggested that an opposition to unchosen inequality on the grounds of unfairness is compatible with a range of accounts as to which inequalities are fair. I argue that forms of responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism face a challenge i...
| Autore principale: | |
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| Tipo di documento: | Elettronico Articolo |
| Lingua: | Inglese |
| Verificare la disponibilità: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Caricamento...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Pubblicazione: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
[2018]
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| In: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Anno: 2018, Volume: 21, Fascicolo: 5, Pagine: 1205-1218 |
| Notazioni IxTheo: | NCC Etica sociale VA Filosofia |
| Altre parole chiave: | B
Luck Egalitarianism
B Correttezza B Desert B Equality B Responsibility B Inequality |
| Accesso online: |
Accesso probabilmente gratuito Volltext (Resolving-System) |
| Riepilogo: | Recent literature on responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism has suggested that an opposition to unchosen inequality on the grounds of unfairness is compatible with a range of accounts as to which inequalities are fair. I argue that forms of responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism face a challenge in the construction of such accounts; namely to explain the fairness of such inequalities specifically, as opposed to their being merely justified in a broader sense. I illustrate the nature of this challenge through an interesting parallel with an issue in value theory in the form of the so-called 'wrong kind of reason' problem. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
| Comprende: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-018-9963-x |