Doing, Allowing, Gains, and Losses
This paper examines Kahneman and Tversky's standard explanation for preference reversal due to framing effects in the famous "Asian flu" case. It argues that, alongside with their "loss/no gain effect" account, an alternative interpretation, still consistent with the empiric...
Publicado no: | Ethical theory and moral practice |
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Autor principal: | |
Tipo de documento: | Recurso Electrónico Artigo |
Idioma: | Inglês |
Verificar disponibilidade: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Publicado em: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
[2018]
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Em: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Ano: 2018, Volume: 21, Número: 5, Páginas: 1107-1118 |
Classificações IxTheo: | NCA Ética ZD Psicologia |
Outras palavras-chave: | B
Loss / no gain effect
B Doing and Allowing B Endowment effect B Prospect Theory |
Acesso em linha: |
Presumably Free Access Volltext (Resolving-System) |
Resumo: | This paper examines Kahneman and Tversky's standard explanation for preference reversal due to framing effects in the famous "Asian flu" case. It argues that, alongside with their "loss/no gain effect" account, an alternative interpretation, still consistent with the empirical data, amounts to a more reasonable psychological explanation for the preference reversal. Specifically, my hypothesis is that shifts in the baseline induce shifts in the agents' classification of the same action as "doing harm" rather than "allowing harm to occur", and that people are risk-seeking when it comes to avoid causing extra deaths-doing harm-and risk-averse when it comes to preventing more deaths-by the means of allowing other deaths to occur as a side effect. I then survey the two most influential concurrent accounts in the moral literature, with respect to the relation between the loss/no gain and the doing/allowing distinction: Horowitz's reductionist conclusion, which argues that the latter collapses into the former, and Kamm's rebuttal, which claims instead that the two distinctions can be pulled apart. I eventually explain why my interpretation differs from both these positions. |
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ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
Obras secundárias: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-018-9949-8 |