The argument from self-defeating beliefs against deontology

There is a tendency to use data from neuroscience, cognitive science and experimental psychology to rail against philosophical ethics. Recently, Joshua Greene has argued that deontological judgments tend to be supported by emotional responses to irrelevant features, whereas consequentialist judgment...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Mihailov, Emilian (Author)
Format: Electronic/Print Article
Language:English
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Published: Peeters [2015]
In: Ethical perspectives
Year: 2015, Volume: 22, Issue: 4, Pages: 573-600
Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains:B Greene, Joshua 1974- / Deontology / Emotion / Consequentialism
IxTheo Classification:NCA Ethics
VA Philosophy
Online Access: Volltext (doi)
Description
Summary:There is a tendency to use data from neuroscience, cognitive science and experimental psychology to rail against philosophical ethics. Recently, Joshua Greene has argued that deontological judgments tend to be supported by emotional responses to irrelevant features, whereas consequentialist judgments are more reliable because they tend to be supported by cognitive processes. In this article, I will analyse the evidence used by Greene to suggest a different kind of argument against deontology, which I will call the argument from self-defeating beliefs. The charge of this type of argument amounts to exposing a psychological nature of deontological judgements that is supposedly rejected by deontologists. I will argue that the alleged evidence is poorly understood, mixed and indeterminate, failing to endorse general conclusions about the psychological processes underlying deontological judgements.
ISSN:1370-0049
Contains:Enthalten in: Ethical perspectives
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.2143/EP.22.4.3127268