Relational views of ethical obligation in Wittgenstein, Lévinas and Løgstrup
The aim of the present article is to explore relational views of the source of ethical obligation, that is, views according to which the source and binding character of ethical obligation lies in our relation to something else, that being the world or the other person. Relational views are represent...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic/Print Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Peeters
[2015]
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| In: |
Ethical perspectives
Year: 2015, Volume: 22, Issue: 1, Pages: 15-38 |
| Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Norm justification
/ Duty
/ Relation
/ Wittgenstein, Ludwig 1889-1951
/ Lévinas, Emmanuel 1906-1995
/ Løgstrup, Knud E. 1905-1981
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| IxTheo Classification: | NCA Ethics |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (doi) |
| Summary: | The aim of the present article is to explore relational views of the source of ethical obligation, that is, views according to which the source and binding character of ethical obligation lies in our relation to something else, that being the world or the other person. Relational views are represented here by the views of ethics found in the ethical thinking of Ludwig Wittgenstein, Emmanuel Lévinas and the Danish philosopher K.E. Løgstrup. In the philosophy of Wittgenstein, we find a description of two challenges that face relational approaches to ethical obligation, challenges that we here label the make-it-personal challenge and the content challenge, which are used in the article to spell out the nature and commitments of relational views. The resources to overcome the first challenge are found in Lévinas’ idea that the "I" is individuated and becomes a subject through responsibility for the other. However, Lévinas cannot provide us with an answer to the second challenge, and we turn therefore to Løgstrup’s development of a notion of the content of ethical obligation as arising from the interplay between the responsiveness to a radical and silent demand to take care of the other and my personal view on and understanding of life. Løgstrup thus presents us with the most promising form of relational view of ethical obligation, a view that also brings into focus the potential of Wittgenstein's philosophy for understanding ethical obligation. |
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| ISSN: | 1370-0049 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Ethical perspectives
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.2143/EP.22.1.3073456 |