Wittgenstein, meta-ethics and the subject matter of moral philosophy
Several authors claim that, according to Wittgenstein, ethics has no particular subject matter and that, consequently, there is and can be no such thing as meta-ethics. These authors argue that, for Wittgenstein, a sentence’s belonging to ethics is a classification by use rather than by subject matt...
| Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
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| Τύπος μέσου: | Εκτύπωση Άρθρο |
| Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
| Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Έκδοση: |
[2015]
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| Στο/Στη: |
Ethical perspectives
Έτος: 2015, Τόμος: 22, Τεύχος: 1, Σελίδες: 69-98 |
| Τυποποιημένες (ακολουθίες) λέξεων-κλειδιών: | B
Μεταηθική
/ Ηθική (μοτίβο)
/ Αντικείμενο (φιλοσοφία, μοτίβο) (Φιλοσοφία (μοτίβο))
/ Wittgenstein, Ludwig 1889-1951
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| Σημειογραφίες IxTheo: | NCA Ηθική |
| Σύνοψη: | Several authors claim that, according to Wittgenstein, ethics has no particular subject matter and that, consequently, there is and can be no such thing as meta-ethics. These authors argue that, for Wittgenstein, a sentence’s belonging to ethics is a classification by use rather than by subject matter, and that ethics is a pervasive dimension of life rather than a distinguishable region or strand thereof. In this article, I will critically examine the reasons and arguments given for these claims. In my view, a Wittgensteinian perspective does not exclude the possibility of doing meta-ethics and of there being a particular subject matter of moral philosophy. These alleged impossibilities are not the distinguishing marks of Wittgensteinian moral philosophy. What distinguishes the latter from traditional moral philosophy is, rather, its emphasis on alternative ways of thinking about the subject matter of moral philosophy. |
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| ISSN: | 1370-0049 |
| Περιλαμβάνει: | Enthalten in: Ethical perspectives
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