Wittgenstein, meta-ethics and the subject matter of moral philosophy
Several authors claim that, according to Wittgenstein, ethics has no particular subject matter and that, consequently, there is and can be no such thing as meta-ethics. These authors argue that, for Wittgenstein, a sentence’s belonging to ethics is a classification by use rather than by subject matt...
| Главный автор: | |
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| Формат: | Print Статья |
| Язык: | Английский |
| Проверить наличие: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Опубликовано: |
[2015]
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| В: |
Ethical perspectives
Год: 2015, Том: 22, Выпуск: 1, Страницы: 69-98 |
| Нормированные ключевые слова (последовательности): | B
Метаэтика
/ Этика (мотив)
/ Объект (философия, мотив) (Философия (мотив))
/ Wittgenstein, Ludwig 1889-1951
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| Индексация IxTheo: | NCA Этика |
| Итог: | Several authors claim that, according to Wittgenstein, ethics has no particular subject matter and that, consequently, there is and can be no such thing as meta-ethics. These authors argue that, for Wittgenstein, a sentence’s belonging to ethics is a classification by use rather than by subject matter, and that ethics is a pervasive dimension of life rather than a distinguishable region or strand thereof. In this article, I will critically examine the reasons and arguments given for these claims. In my view, a Wittgensteinian perspective does not exclude the possibility of doing meta-ethics and of there being a particular subject matter of moral philosophy. These alleged impossibilities are not the distinguishing marks of Wittgensteinian moral philosophy. What distinguishes the latter from traditional moral philosophy is, rather, its emphasis on alternative ways of thinking about the subject matter of moral philosophy. |
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| ISSN: | 1370-0049 |
| Второстепенные работы: | Enthalten in: Ethical perspectives
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