Moderater erkenntnistheoretischer Naturalismus und der Wert des Wissens
The paper distinguishes various forms of epistemological naturalism and examines whether process reliabilism, a paradigm example of moderate epistemological naturalism, can account for the apparent surplus value of knowledge over mere true belief. Alvin Goldman and Erik Olsson have recently proposed...
Subtitles: | Christliches Menschenbild und Naturalismus$dPhilosophische Standortbestimmungen |
---|---|
Main Author: | |
Format: | Print Article |
Language: | German |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Echter
2011
|
In: |
Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie
Year: 2011, Volume: 133, Issue: 3/4, Pages: 422-441 |
Parallel Edition: | Electronic
|
Summary: | The paper distinguishes various forms of epistemological naturalism and examines whether process reliabilism, a paradigm example of moderate epistemological naturalism, can account for the apparent surplus value of knowledge over mere true belief. Alvin Goldman and Erik Olsson have recently proposed a novel solution to this axiological question. Forming true beliefs in a reliable way, they maintain, raises the conditional probability that the subject will have more true beliefs in the future. I argue that this proposai confronts various problems. Most of them can be remedied if one postulâtes that the subject have higher-order beliefs towards his or her epistemic situation. This aspect of the conditional probability solution, 1 argue, is neutral with respect to metaphysical naturalism regarding higher-order representations. |
---|---|
ISSN: | 0044-2895 |
Contains: | Enthalten in: Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie
|