The eternity of the world and the distinction between creation and conservation
According to an important set of medieval arguments, it is impossible to make a distinction between creation and conservation on the assumption of a beginningless universe. The argument is that, on such an assumption, either God is never causally sufficient for the existence of the universe, or, if...
Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
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Τύπος μέσου: | Ηλεκτρονικά/Εκτύπωση Άρθρο |
Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
Έκδοση: |
2006
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Στο/Στη: |
Religious studies
Έτος: 2006, Τόμος: 42, Τεύχος: 4, Σελίδες: 403-416 |
Τυποποιημένες (ακολουθίες) λέξεων-κλειδιών: | B
Θεός (μοτίβο)
/ Δημιουργία (μοτίβο)
/ Αιτιότητα
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Σημειογραφίες IxTheo: | AB Φιλοσοφία της θρησκείας, Κριτική της θρησκείας, Αθεϊσμός NBC Δόγμα του Θεού ΝΒD Δόγμα της Δημιουργίας |
Διαθέσιμο Online: |
Volltext (doi) |
Σύνοψη: | According to an important set of medieval arguments, it is impossible to make a distinction between creation and conservation on the assumption of a beginningless universe. The argument is that, on such an assumption, either God is never causally sufficient for the existence of the universe, or, if He is at one time causally sufficient for the existence of the universe, He is at all times causally sufficient for the universe, and occasionalism is true. I defend the claim that these arguments are successful. Since Christian theology requires a distinction between creation and conservation, arguments in favour of the possible eternity of the world fail. |
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ISSN: | 0034-4125 |
Περιλαμβάνει: | In: Religious studies
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1017/S0034412506008572 |