Augustine and Republican Liberty: Contextualizing Coercion
One of the most controversial aspects of Augustine's political thought is his use of imperial power to coerce religious dissenters. While scholars have sought to situate Augustine's justifications of coercion within his historical, social, and political contexts, even the most helpful appr...
Main Author: | |
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Format: | Electronic/Print Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
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Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Villanova Univ. Press
[2017]
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In: |
Augustinian studies
Year: 2017, Volume: 48, Issue: 1/2, Pages: 119-159 |
IxTheo Classification: | CG Christianity and Politics KAB Church history 30-500; early Christianity NBM Doctrine of Justification |
Further subjects: | B
Justification (Christian theology)
B RELIGIOUS dissenters B AUGUSTINE, Saint, Bishop of Hippo, 354-430 B Augustinus, Aurelius Saint (354-430) De correctione Donatistarum B Liberty B Scholars B Political Science |
Online Access: |
Volltext (doi) |
Summary: | One of the most controversial aspects of Augustine's political thought is his use of imperial power to coerce religious dissenters. While scholars have sought to situate Augustine's justifications of coercion within his historical, social, and political contexts, even the most helpful approaches do not alleviate concerns that Augustine's defense of coercion violates individual liberty. This paper argues that one reason for this is that many defenders and detractors tend to view Augustine's defense through a largely liberal lens, assuming a modern conception of liberty and legitimacy that is alien to his late antique context. In contrast, this paper highlights how Augustine appropriates republican principles from his Roman predecessors to justify coercion and place limits on its use. In particular, it focuses on Augustine's commitments to: (1) liberty as non-domination; (2) legitimate authority and the rule of law as constraints on arbitrary power; and (3) contestability, publicity, and immanent critique as means of preventing domination and holding power accountable. By showing how the content and form of Augustine's reasoning align with republican principles, this paper suggests that his defense of coercion appears less inimical to liberty in his Roman context than his modern interpreters typically assume. The paper concludes by considering how this republican approach might help to preserve liberty and prevent domination in our own time. |
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Item Description: | behandelt unter anderem ep. 93; ep. 185 |
ISSN: | 0094-5323 |
Contains: | Enthalten in: Augustinian studies
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.5840/augstudies201792636 |